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Abstract—In the big data era, more and more cloud-based
data-driven applications are developed that leverage individual
data to provide certain valuable services (the utilities). On the
other hand, since the same set of individual data could be
utilized to infer the individual’s certain sensitive information, it
creates new channels to snoop the individual’s privacy. Hence
it is of great importance to develop techniques that enable
the data owners to release privatized data, that can still be
utilized for certain premised intended purpose. Existing data
releasing approaches, however, are either privacy-emphasized
(no consideration on utility) or utility-driven (no guarantees
on privacy). In this work, we propose a two-step perturbation-
based utility-aware privacy-preserving data releasing framework.
First, certain predefined privacy and utility problems are learned
from the public domain data (background knowledge). Later, our
approach leverages the learned knowledge to precisely perturb
the data owners’ data into privatized data that can be successfully
utilized for certain intended purpose (learning to succeed),
without jeopardizing certain predefined privacy (training to fail).
Extensive experiments have been conducted on Human Activity
Recognition, Census Income and Bank Marketing datasets to
demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our framework.
Index Terms—IEEE, IEEEtran, journal, LATEX, paper, tem-
plate.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS the advent and advance of cloud computing and datascience in this big data era, more and more cloud-based
data-driven applications are developed by different service
providers (the data users, such as Facebook, LinkedIn and
Google). Most of these applications leverage the vast amount
of data collected from each individual (the data owner) to
offer certain valuable service back to the corresponding in-
dividual or for the other political and commercial purposes,
such as friend recommendation, human activity recognition,
health monitoring, targeted advertising and election prediction.
However, the same set of data could be repurposed in different
ways to infer certain sensitive personal information, which
would jeopardize the individual’s privacy.
In the recent Facebook data leak scandal (April, 2018) [1],
about 87 million Facebook users’ data were collected by a
Facebook quiz app (a cloud-based data-driven application) and
then paired with information taken from their social media pro-
file (including their gender, age, relationship status, location
and “likes”) without any privacy-preserving operations being
taken other than anonymization. Thus, the data user or the
other adversaries that have the access to the data can still infer
certain sensitive information of each individual from his/her
data, such as identity, sexual orientation and marital status. The
unprecedented data leak scandal raised the alarm of privacy
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Bob: hospital [data user] 
If I have disease A?
If Alice has disease B?
Eve: attacker [another data user] 
If Alice is adult?
If Alice is female?
disease A diagnosis 
Alice: patient [data owner]
Figure 1: An example in patient-hospital scenario.
concerns among cloud-based data-driven applications which
could became a big obstacle that impedes the individuals from
releasing their data to the service providers to receive valuable
service (the utilities).
A similar situation could happen in the patient-hospital
scenario as shown in Fig. 1. Patient Alice (the data owner)
would like to release her data to hospital Bob (the data
user) with the premise of using it for disease A diagnosis.
However, people like Eve (could be Bob), who works in the
same hospital and has the access to Alice’s data, could use
the same data to infer certain irrelevant sensitive information
about Alice, such as her disease B diagnosis. In this case,
some individuals (e.g., Facebook users or Alice) would like
to release their data to receive good utilities, while on the
premise that the service providers are prevented from inferring
certain sensitive information from their data (e.g., identity,
sexual orientation and marital status). Therefore, it is of vital
importance to develop a utility-aware privacy-preserving data
releasing framework for cloud-based data-driven applications,
which enables the released data to be utilized for certain
premised intended purpose (utility target), without jeopardiz-
ing the corresponding data owner’s certain privacy target.
Designing such general utility-aware privacy-preserving
data releasing framework is rather challenging. To date, a few
related approaches have been proposed [2], [3], [4], [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9], [10]. However, these approaches cannot fulfil all
the privacy requirements needed in the cloud-based data-driven
application scenario. For example, approaches that relied on
additive or multiplicative random noise perturbation [3] and
k-anonymity [2] cannot handle the curse of dimensionality.
Differential privacy machine learning approaches [4], [5], [6]
have been proposed to publish machine learning models while
preserving the training data privacy. In this paper, however,
we consider the scenario that the machine learning models
have been trained in advance by the cloud-based service
providers (the data users). The data to be protected would
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2appear as the testing data, which is beyond the scope of
those approaches. Besides, [11] has shown that some record-
level differential privacy approaches applied to collaborative
learning scenario are ineffective in dealing with inference
attacks. Dimensionality reduction based approaches [7], [8],
[9], [10], [12] have been proposed to preserve privacy while
maintaining most of the utility. However, despite of their
good experimental performance on several public datasets,
those approaches didn’t introduce any uncertainty to hide
the sensitive information, which failed to show the needed
guarantees on the privacy targets mathematically.
To address the challenges mentioned above, in this paper,
we devote to solve a two-party exemplar problem. The data
user (i.e., the cloud-based service provider) use his/her domain
knowledge and public domain data to train a model to provide
certain service in advance. The data owner would like to
receive the service via sharing his/her own data as the testing
data to the data user. The data owner predefines several privacy
targets (sensitive information) that he/she would like to prevent
the data user from inferring from his/her data. By “predefines”,
we assume that the data owner knows what the malicious
inference and the corresponding domain knowledge and public
domain data will be utilized by the malicious data users.
In this paper, a two-step perturbation-based utility-aware
privacy-preserving data releasing framework is proposed to
tackle this problem. Given certain specific utility/privacy
targets (i.e., the inference problems and the corresponding
domain knowledge and public domain data), our approach
precisely transforms the original data into privatized data
that can be successfully utilized for certain intended purpose
(learning to succeed), without jeopardizing certain predefined
privacy (training to fail). The first step is a coarse-grained data
perturbation method, Joint Utility/Privacy Analysis (JUPA).
JUPA is an subspace-optimized projection method, which
combines the advantages from both DCA [7] (utility driven
projection) and MDR [8] (privacy emphasized projection), and
tries to find a subspace projection that could optimize for both
utility and privacy targets with the knowledge learned from
the public datasets. The second step is a fine-grained data
perturbation method inspired by the “label changing” problems
(e.g., adversarial image perturbation [13], [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18], [19]) in the computer vision area, where in order to
change the image’s class membership, very small perturbations
are added to the image that remain quasi-imperceptible to a
human vision system. For instance, [15] proposed a Maximum
Mean Discrepancy [20] (MMD) statistic test related approach
to make semantic change to the appearance of given images.
We propose to use a MMD-like loss function to leverage the
knowledge (i.e., the discriminant distance among the classes
in each privacy target) learned from the public domain dataset
and precisely perturb each coarse-grain-perturbed data to a
fine-grain-perturbed data that belongs to a randomly selected
privacy target class (the data owner’s secret parameter).
In the experiments, we have tested our frame on three public
datasets: Human Activity Recognition, Census Income and
Bank Marketing datasets. The experiment results demonstrate
that (a) JUPA is a more general utility-aware dimensionality
reduction approach compared with DCA [7] and MDR [8]; (b)
given certain predefined privacy target, our fine-grained data
perturbation approach can reduce the accuracy of the corre-
sponding inference attack to the level of random guessing.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II presents
the related works. Section III presents the preliminaries about
dimensionality reduction and maximum mean discrepancy.
Section IV describes our proposed utility-aware privacy-
preserving data releasing framework. Section V presents the
experimental evaluation. Section VI presents the conclusion
and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A few privacy-preserving data releasing approaches have
been proposed, including solutions based on cryptography
[21], [22], [23], [24], differentially private synthetic data
generation [25], [26], [27], [28], and dimensionality reduction
[29], [7], [8], [9], [10], [12]. Most of the cryptography-based
approaches are designed for specific applications/algorithms.
For instance, [22] developed a privacy-preserving ridge re-
gression system that utilized additive homomorphic encryption
and Garbled circuits to train a ridge regression model with
the encrypted data statistic shares submitted by multiple data
owners. [23] proposed to use cryptographic building blocks
to enable testing new samples while protecting both the ML
model and the submitted samples, in three popular classifica-
tion protocols: hyperplane decision, Naı¨ve Bayes, and decision
trees. Although cryptography-based approaches prevent the
adversaries from performing inference attack on the encrypted
data/model, they are not flexible enough to work for general
data releasing purpose.
Differential privacy (DP) [30] is one of the most popu-
lar standard for quantifying individual privacy. DP aims to
protect the privacy of individuals via adding randomness to
the aggregate information. Differentially private synthetic data
generation approaches utilize those differentially private aggre-
gate information to generate synthetic data. For instance, [26]
considers to use differential privacy component analysis for
data releasing. “Plausible Deniability” [27], has been proposed
and achieved by applying a privacy test after generating the
synthetic data. The generative model proposed in [27] is a
probabilistic model which captures the joint distribution of
features based on correlation-based feature selection (CFS)
[31]. [25] proposed an algorithm which combines the mul-
tiplicative weights approach and exponential mechanism for
differentially private data release. [28] proposed a micro-
aggregation [32] based differential private data releasing ap-
proach which reduces the noise required by differential privacy
based on k-anonymity. Although DP-based approaches provide
strong guarantees on individuals’ privacy, they does not take
any utility targets into account in designing their privacy-
preserving data releasing mechanisms.
The dimensionality reduction approaches provide a promis-
ing way to irreversibly transform the original data, and publish
the transformed data for general usage. [29] proposed to
use random projection matrix to project the original data
to a lower dimensional space. However, the random projec-
tion method mainly focuses on the privacy targets without
3considering the utility targets, which downgrades its utility
performance. A few dimensionality reduction based privacy-
preserving approaches focusing on maintaining the utility
have been proposed [7], [8], [9], [10], [12]. For instance, [7]
proposed to use Discriminant Component Analysis (DCA), a
supervised version of Principle Component Analysis (PCA), to
project the data into a lower dimensional space that maximizes
the discriminant power for specific targets. However, since
DCA mainly focuses on the utility target, it might maintain
the utility while somewhat preserve the privacy because of
the information loss through the dimensionality reduction.
However, DCA could not control or adjust the projection
matrix in terms of the privacy target. [8] proposed Multi-class
Discriminant Ratio (MDR), which projects the data based on
a pair of classification targets, (a) a privacy-insensitive and
(b) a privacy-sensitive target. RUCA [12], improves the MDR
to provide more flexibility to adjust the trade-off or tuning
between utility and privacy. However. these approaches do
not introduce any uncertainty/randomness to hide the sensitive
information, which failed to show the needed guarantees on
the privacy targets mathematically.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Dimensionality Reduction via Eigenvalue Decomposition
An important component of our framework is supervised di-
mensionality reduction technique (i.e., it relies on data labels).
Consider a dataset with N training samples {x1, x2, . . . , xN},
where each sample has M features (xi ∈ RM ). Since the same
dataset could be utilized in different classification problems,
each classification problem c has a unique set of labels Lci
associated with the corresponding training samples xi. Without
loss of generality, we assume the dataset could be utilized for a
single utility target U and a single privacy target P . Then, each
training sample xi has two labels Lui ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lu} and
Lpi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lp}. Lu and Lp are the numbers of classes
of the utility target and the privacy target, respectively.
Based on Fisher’s linear discriminant analysis [33], [34],
given a classification problem, the within-class scatter matrix
of its training samples contains most of the “noise informa-
tion”, while the between-class scatter matrix of its training
samples contains most of the “signal information”.
We define the within-class scatter matrix and the between-
class scatter matrix for the utility target as follows:
SWU =
Lu∑
l=1
( Nul∑
i=1
xix
T
i −Nul µlµTl
)
(1)
SBU =
Lu∑
l=1
Nul µlµ
T
l −NµµT (2)
where µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi, µl is the mean vector of all training
samples belonging to class l, Nul is the number of training
samples belonging to class l of the utility target.
Similarly, for the privacy target the within-class scatter
matrix and the between-class scatter matrix define as:
SWP =
Lp∑
l=1
( Npl∑
i=1
xix
T
i −Npl µlµTl
)
(3)
SBP =
Lp∑
l=1
Npl µlµ
T
l −NµµT (4)
Let W be an K ×M projection matrix, in which K < M .
Given testing sample x, xˆ = xT ·W is its subspace projection.
Our framework combines the advantages of two eigenvalue de-
composition based dimensionality reduction techniques: DCA
[7] (utility driven projection) and MDR [8] (privacy empha-
sized projection).
1) Discriminant Component Analysis (DCA)DCA [7] in-
volves searching for the projection matrix W ∈ RM×K :
DCA =
det(WTSBUW )
det(WT (S¯ + ρI)W )
(5)
where det(·) is the determinant operator, ρI is a small
regularization term added for numerical stability, and S¯ =
SWU + SBU =
∑N
i=1 xix
T
i −NµµT .
The optimal solution to this problem can be derived from
the first K principal generalized eigenvectors of the matrix
pencil (SBU , S¯ + ρI).
2) Multi-class Discriminant Ratio (MDR)MDR [8] consid-
ers both the utility target and the privacy target, which is
defined as:
MDR =
det(WT (SBU )W )
det(WT (SBP + ρI)W )
(6)
where ρI is a small regularization term added for numerical
stability.
The optimal solution to MDR can be derived from the
first K principal generalized eigenvectors of the matrix pencil
(SBU , SBP + ρI).
B. Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD)
The Maximum Mean Discrepancy [20] (MMD) statistic
has been proposed to test whether two distributions p and
q are different based on the samples drawn from each of
them. In this work, our fine-grained data perturbation uti-
lized a MMD-like loss function inspired by a kernel-MMD
solution [35]. Let p and q be two distributions defined on a
domain X . Given observations X := {x1, x2, . . . , xm} and
Y := {y1, y2, . . . , yn}, drawn i.i.d. from p and q respectively,
the kernel-MMD solution [35] is defined as:
MMD[F , X, Y ] = 1
m
m∑
i=1
φ(xi)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(yi)
=
[ 1
m2
m∑
i,j=1
k(xi, xj)− 2
mn
m,n∑
i,j=1
k(xi, yj)
+
1
n2
n∑
i,j=1
k(yi, yj)
] 1
2
(7)
where F is a unit ball in a universal RKHS H, defined on the
compact metric space X , with associated kernel k(·, ·), and
φ(x) = k(x, ·). MMD[F , X, Y ] ≈ 0, if and only if p = q.
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Figure 2: A Utility-aware Privacy-preserving Data Releasing Framework.
IV. UTILITY-AWARE PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA
RELEASING FRAMEWORK
A. Framework Overview
Problem Statement. As illustrated in Fig. 2, our framework
involves two parties: the data owner(s) and the data user(s).
The data user uses public data (background knowledge) to
train a machine learning model (i.e., classification model) in
advance to provide certain service (the utility targets). The
data owner would like to release her private data to the data
user for the purpose of the utility targets, and prevent the
malicious data user from inferring certain predefined sensitive
information (the privacy targets). Assume the data owner
and the data user have access to similar set of public data
(background knowledge) utilized for both utility and privacy
targets, but the data owner does’t know the data user’s machine
learning model. Our goal is to perturb the data owner’s private
data x into perturbed data z with the knowledge of predefined
utility and privacy targets, such that the perturbed data z could
be utilized successfully for the intended purposes (i.e., the
utility target achieves similar accuracies using either x or
z), without jeopardizing the data owner’s privacy (i.e., the
privacy target get no better accuracy than random guessing
while using z). To achieve this goal, we propose a two-step
data perturbation framework (Fig. 2). More details about the
two steps are described in Section IV-B and Section IV-C.
Threat Model. The adversaries in our framework are the
malicious data users, who have the access to the public
data that could be utilized as the training data for certain
predefined privacy target. The adversaries would like to infer
the knowledge (i.e., class) of the privacy target (i.e., classifi-
cation problems) associated with the data owner’s private data
based on the corresponding perturbed data and public data
(background knowledge). For instance, as shown in Fig. 2,
we shall assume that the predefined privacy target is a two-
class (i.e., {P1, P2}) classification problem (utility targets are
independent from the privacy task). Let X = [XP1 , XP2 ]
be the public training samples for the privacy target, where
XPi (i ∈ {1, 2}) presents the samples associated with class i.
Let x be the data owner’s private data, where s ∈ {P1, P2}
is its original (privacy target) class and t ∈ {P1, P2} is its
expected (privacy target) class after our privacy-preserving
data releasing operation. The data owner could publish z
(i.e., the perturbed version of x) using our framework F :
z ← F (x, t,XP1 , XP2). The adversary has to use his/her
approach A(z,XP1 , XP2) to guess/infer the original (privacy
task) class s.
B. Coarse-grained Data Perturbation
In this section, we introduce a general dimensionality re-
duction method Joint Utility/Privacy Analysis (JUPA). JUPA
combines the advantages from both DCA [7] (utility driven
projection) and MDR [8] (privacy emphasized projection), and
tries to find a subspace projection that could optimize for both
utility and privacy targets with the knowledge learned from the
public datasets. Our problem settings are exactly the same as
described in Section III-A. For simplicity, we shall start from
a single utility/privacy target scenario. JUPA tries to find a
projection matrix W that maximize the following function:
JUPA =
det(WT (SBU + ρ
′
1SWP )W )
det(WT (SWU + ρ1SBP + ρ0I)W )
(8)
where det(·) is the determinant operator, ρ0 is regularization
parameter added for numerical stability, and ρ1, ρ′1 are privacy-
utility adjustment parameters.
The optimal solution to JUPA can be derived from the
first K principal generalized eigenvectors of the matrix pencil
(SBU + ρ
′
1SWP , SWU + ρ1SBP + ρ0I). After getting the
projection matrix W , we perturb the data owner’s private
data x and the training data matrix X as xˆ = xTW and
Xˆ = XTW .
Additionally, JUPA can be generalized to multiple util-
ity/privacy targets by including multiple corresponding scatter
matrices:
JUPA =
det(WT (
∑Nu
i=1 SBUi +
∑Np
i=1 ρ
′
iSWPi )W )
det(WT (
∑Nu
i=1 SWUi +
∑Np
i=1 ρiSBPi + ρ0I)W )
(9)
Utility vs. “Somewhat Privacy”. JUPA maintains a trade-
off between the utility and “somewhat privacy”. “somewhat
privacy” means our coarse-grained perturbation approach opti-
mizes towards privacy, but could not provide privacy guarantee
(as in Section IV-C). On one hand, JUPA optimizes a subspace
projection that maximizes the “signal to noise” ratio of the
utility targets. On the other hand, JUPA optimizes towards
two “mappings” for privacy targets: a “many-to-one” mapping,
after which data belonging to the same privacy class are near
each other (tuned by ρ′1); and a “one-to-many” mapping, after
which data belonging to different privacy classes are far from
each other (tuned by ρ1). By adjusting ρ1 and ρ′1, JUPA could
5be tuned between DCA [7], MDR [8] and RUCA [12]. For
instance, if ρ1 = ρ′1 = 0, this projection method becomes
DCA; if ρ1 is very large and ρ′1 = 0, it becomes MDR as the
term SBP dominates (SWU + ρ1SBP + ρ0I); and if ρ
′
1 = 0
it becomes RUCA. Higher value of ρ1 and ρ′1 means more
emphasis on the privacy targets.
C. Fine-grained Data Perturbation
In this section, we introduce a perturbation approach that
gradually change the privacy target classification label of a
given data owner’s coarse-grained perturbed data xˆ from its
source (original) label s to a randomly selected target label t,
via adding precisely calculated noise. For simplicity, we shall
assume a single 2-class ({P1, P2}) privacy target scenario.
Except for the data owner’s coarse-grained perturbed data xˆ,
another input for this approach is the coarse-grained perturbed
training data matrix Xˆ = [XˆP1 , XˆP2 ], where Xˆ will be split
into two parts: XˆG = [XˆGP1 , Xˆ
G
P2
] and XˆV = [XˆVP1 , Xˆ
V
P2
].
XˆG is the “ground truth” training data matrix being used to
gradually “train” the fine-grained perturbed data. XˆV is the
“verification” training data matrix being used to verify the
current label of the input data xˆ and intermediate perturbed
data.
Given coarse-perturbed private data xˆ, we start from ran-
domly selecting a target label t ∈ {P1, P2} for xˆ, and use
the following function to decide its current (source) label
s ∈ {P1, P2}:
s =label(xˆ) = argmin
{l:l∈{P1,P2}}
( 1
|XˆVl |
∑
xˆi∈XˆVl
φ(xˆi)− φ(xˆ)
)2
= argmin
{l:l∈{P1,P2}}
1
|XˆVl |2
∑
xˆi,xˆj∈XˆVl
k(xˆi, xˆj)
− 2|XˆVl |
∑
xˆi∈XˆVl
k(xˆi, xˆ) + k(xˆ, xˆ)
= argmin
{l:l∈{P1,P2}}
1
|XˆVl |2
∑
xˆi,xˆj∈XˆVl
k(xˆi, xˆj)
− 2|XˆVl |
∑
xˆi∈XˆVl
k(xˆi, xˆ)
(10)
Our approach perturbs xˆ in an iterative fashion. Let zi be
the ith (i = 1, 2, . . . ) intermediate perturbed data. Then, our
iterative data sanitization function is defined as:
z0 =xˆ
zi =zi−1 + θ(zi−1) (i = 1, 2, . . . )
(11)
where θ(zi) is the noise vector being added to zi. The starting
noise vector θ(z0) could be initiated as a zero vector or a
random vector.
In order to compute θ(zi) in each iteration, inspired by
the kernel-MMD solution [35] described in Section III-B, we
define a loss function as:
L(θ(zi)) =
( 1
nt
∑
xˆi∈XˆGt
φ(xˆi)− φ(zi)
)2
− ( 1
ns
∑
xˆi∈XˆGs
φ(xˆi)− φ(zi)
)2
+
λ
2
‖θ(zi)‖22
=
1
n2t
∑
xˆi,xˆj∈XˆGt
k(xˆi, xˆj)− 1
n2s
∑
xˆi,xˆj∈XˆGs
k(xˆi, xˆj)
+
2
ns
∑
xˆi∈XˆGs
k(xˆi, zi)− 2
nt
∑
xˆi∈XˆGt
k(xˆi, zi)
+
λ
2
‖θ(zi)‖22
(12)
A large negative value of L(θ(zi)) indicates zi belongs to
the target class, and a large positive value of L(θ(zi)) indicates
zi belongs to the source class. Therefore, the value of θ(zi)
is obtain by minimizing the loss function L(θ(zi)) gradually,
until label(zi) is t. To solve this optimization problem, we use
a gradient descent approach:
5θ(zi)L(θ(zi)) =
1
ns
∑
xˆi∈XˆGs
k(xˆi, zi)
xˆi − zi
σ2
− 1
nt
∑
xˆi∈XˆGt
k(xˆi, zi)
xˆi − zi
σ2
+ λ · θ(zi)
(13)
θ(zi) = θ(zi)− α5θ(zi) L(θ(zi)) (14)
where we use RBF kernel k(xi, xj) = e
− ‖xi−xj‖
2
2
2σ2 as
an example, and α is the learning rate. Finding the most
appropriate kernel function is beyond the scope of this paper,
and there are a few papers discussing about kernel selection
[36], [37]. In the experimental evaluation, we use the kernel
function that gives the highest cross-validation accuracy on the
training data.
Privacy Guarantee. Considering the “two-class” scenario
described in Section IV-A, we assume the adversaries’ ap-
proach A(z,XP1 , XP2) would be certain kernel-based classi-
fication models trained by public available dataset [XP1 , XP2 ].
Inspired by semantic security [38], we give our definition of
a privacy-preserving data releasing framework as below.
Definition 1. (Privacy-preserving Data Releasing Frame-
work.) F is a privacy-preserving data releasing framework,
if given predefined privacy target and certain adversaries’
approach A, the advantage Adv[A,F ] = |Pr(s = P1) −
Pr(s = P2)| is negligible. (It is straightforward to generate
this definition to multi-class scenarios.)
Theorem 1. Our proposed framework is a privacy-preserving
data releasing framework.
Proof. Given predefined privacy target, certain appropriate
kernel function and public available dataset [XP1 , XP2 ], our
framework precisely perturbs the private data x towards a
6perturbed data z associated with a randomly selected pri-
vacy target label t. Then, given z and [XP1 , XP2 ], we have
Pr(s = P1) = Pr(s = P2) =
1
2 . Therefore, Adv[A,F ] =|Pr(s = P1)− Pr(s = P2)| = 0 is negligible.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Datasets
We have tested our proposed frame with three public
datasets: Human Activity Recognition (HAR) [39], Census
Income (Census) [40] and Bank Marketing (Bank) [41]. Each
dataset has been split into three subsets: training samples (for
perturbation approaches), testing samples (data owner’s private
data), and adversary training samples (for inference attacks).
Human Activity Recognition (HAR) [39] HAR contains
smartphone sensor data (i.e., accelerometer data) of 30 sub-
jects’ daily activities, where each sample has 561 features and
two labels: activities of daily living (ADL) and identity (ID).
In our experiments, we consider ADL as the utility target and
ID as the privacy target. Specifically, ADL has 6 types of
labels: “Walking”, “Walking Upstairs”, “Walking Downstairs”,
“Sitting”, “Standing” and “Laying”. On the other hand, ID has
30 types of labels, since 30 subjects have contributed to this
dataset. The original dataset is unbalanced. For instance, some
subjects contribute more data than the others and some ADLs
happen more often than the others. As such, for each different
ADL-ID combination (6 × 30 = 180 combinations in total),
we randomly sampled 20 samples from the original dataset,
resulting in 3,600 samples. The numbers of training, testing
and adversary training samples are 1,440, 720 and 1,440,
respectively. We kept the number of samples in all ADL-ID
combinations equal in all sets.
Census Income (Census) [40] Census has been used to
predict whether someone’s income exceeds $50K/yr based on
census data. We identify two labels of this dataset: “income”,
where the data user tries to classify if someone’s income is
“high” (higher than $50K/yr) or “low” (lower or equal to
$50K/yr); and “gender” (i.e., male/female) which was one
feature in the original dataset. Since based on the application,
either “income” or “gender” can be served as utility or privacy
targets, we experimented for both cases. Firstly, we removed
the samples with missing features. Secondly, we turned all
categorical features into numerical features using binary en-
coding, which resulted in 51 features. Lastly, we randomly
sampled 750 samples for each income-gender combination
(2 × 2 = 4 combinations in total) from the original dataset,
resulting in 3,000 samples. The numbers of training, testing
and adversary training samples are 1,200, 600 and 1,200,
respectively. As with the HAR dataset, we kept the number of
samples in all income-gender combinations equal in all sets.
Bank Marketing (Bank) [41] Bank is related with direct
marketing campaigns (phone calls) of a Portuguese banking
institution. The original classification goal is to predict if the
client will subscribe a term deposit (marketing purpose). As
such, we used the marketing purpose (“marketing”) as the
utility target, which is a “yes” or “no” binary classification
problem. We used marital status (“marital”) as the privacy
target, which was one feature in the original dataset. Since very
few samples have “unknown” marital status, we removed those
samples. Thus, “marital” has 3 types of labels: “divorced”,
“married” and “single”. As with the Census, we turned all
categorical features into numerical features using binary en-
coding, resulting in 31 features. We randomly sampled 410
samples for each marketing-marital combination (2 × 3 = 6
combinations in total) from the original dataset, resulting in
2,460 samples. The numbers of training, testing and adversary
training samples are 984, 492 and 984, respectively. We
also kept the number of samples in all marketing-marital
combinations equal in all sets.
B. Setups
We evaluate the performance of our proposed two perturba-
tion approaches step-by-step, in terms of utility and privacy. In
all the experiments, we utilized RBF-kernel SVM to train the
machine learning classifiers for both the utility and privacy
targets. The utility classifier is to provide certain premised
valuable service, while the privacy classifier is to perform
the adversaries’ inference attack. All the experiments were
performed 15 iterations. At each iteration, a 10-fold cross-
validation grid search was performed to find the best set
of parameters for training utility and privacy classifiers. As
discussed in the last section (Section V-A), we evaluate our
frame using three datasets and four scenarios. Given a scenario
and its dataset, the evaluation metric is the accuracy of its util-
ity/privacy classifiers. Higher accuracy of the utility classifier
means providing better utility. Lower accuracy of the privacy
classifier means less privacy leakage. The baseline (i.e., lowest
accuracy, no privacy leakage) of the privacy classifier should
be equal to the probability of random-guess, of which the
prediction is drawn i.i.d. from a uniform distribution.
For the coarse-grained perturbation, we compare our pro-
posed JUPA with a full-dimensional baseline method and four
existing dimensionality reduction methods, including Random
Projection, PCA, DCA and MDR. Moreover, We evaluate
JUPA with regularization parameter ρ0 = 0.001, and different
combinations of privacy-utility adjustment parameters ρ1 = 1,
102, 104, ρ′1 = 1, 10
2, 104. For the fine-grained perturbation,
we set λ = 0.001, α = 0.1, and use a zero vector to initiate
the starting noise vector θ(z0).
C. Experimental Results
Table I, Table II, Table III and Table IV shows the ex-
perimental results of four scenarios (three datasets), and the
following are the main observations and conclusions drawn
from experimental results.
1) Considering the coarse-grained perturbation approach
alone, JUPA outperforms the other DR methods in terms of
the utility and “somewhat privacy”. Compared with PCA and
random projection, DCA, MDR and JUPA provide better bal-
ance between the utility and “somewhat privacy” performance,
since PCA and random projection are not leveraging any help
from the “label” information. For instance, in Table I, after
applying random projection (coarse-grained), the accuracy of
ID (privacy) dropped from 62.78% to 13.75% (providing one
of the best privacy performance), and the accuracy of ADL
7Table I: The Mean Accuracy Percentage Results of Human Activity Recog-
nition Dataset with K = 5, ADL being the utility target, and ID being the
privacy target.
Projection Method ADL IDCoarse Fine Coarse Fine
Full-Dimensional 97.22 66.94 62.78 3.33
Random Projection 60.28 57.36 13.75 3.33
PCA 84.72 73.33 30.28 3.75
DCA 94.58 93.75 23.61 3.33
MDR 91.67 88.75 22.92 4.58
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 1) 96.11 94.31 21.11 3.75
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 10
2) 95.83 93.47 20.28 3.61
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 10
4) 95.56 93.47 19.72 3.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 1) 94.44 93.33 20.00 3.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
2) 94.17 92.64 17.78 3.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
4) 93.75 92.36 16.67 3.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 1) 92.50 88.19 13.61 3.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
2) 89.58 86.39 12.50 3.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
4) 87.50 86.11 12.08 3.33
(utility) dropped from 97.22% to 60.28% (giving one of the
worst utility performance). On the contrary, after applying
PCA (coarse-grained), the accuracy of either utility or privacy
does not drop much (providing less “somewhat privacy”).
Compared with DCA and MDR, JUPA provides better utility
and “somewhat privacy” performance under certain privacy
parameters. For instance, in Table I, when ρ1 = 1 and ρ′1 = 1,
compared with other DR methods, JUPA (coarse-grained)
provides the highest accuracy (96.11%) of ADL (utility), and
also the second lowest accuracy (only higher than random
projection) (21.11%) of ADL (utility). Results in the other
scenarios are inline with this observation.
2) JUPA provides the flexibility for finding a favorable
trade-off or tuning between utility and privacy by tuning the
privacy parameters. Based on our results, by increasing ρ1 = 1
or ρ′1 = 1, JUPA weights more emphasis on preserving privacy
(providing accuracy) with small amount of accuracy drop on
the utility. For instance, in Table I, adjusting JUPA from
ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 1 to ρ1 = 10
4, ρ′1 = 10
4, results in a 42.78%
drop of the ID (privacy) accuracy (from 21.11% to 12.08%),
while only resulting in a 8.96% drop of the ADL (utility)
accuracy (from 96.11% to 87.50%).
3) Our fine-grained perturbation approach provides the pri-
vacy guarantee. For instance, in all the scenarios, after ap-
plying the fine-grained perturbation, the accuracies of privacy
targets are all converging to or near to the probability of
random-guess.
4) In our framework, combining JUPA with the fine-grained
perturbation outperforms the other options in terms of the
utility. For instance, in Table I, compared with other DR
methods, DCA, MDR and JUPA (fine-grained) provide relative
higher accuracy of ADL (utility) (≤ 86.11%), and when
ρ1 = 1 and ρ′1 = 1, JUPA provides the best utility accuracy
(94.31%). Results in the other scenarios are inline with this
observation. The reason is that even though the fine-grained
perturbation could provide guarantee for privacy, applying
supervised DR methods (DCA, MDR and JUPA) reserves
more utility information and need less noise added to the
coarse-grained perturbed data to achieve the privacy guarantee.
Table II: The Mean Accuracy Percentage Results of Census Income Dataset
with K = 1, income being the utility target, and gender being the privacy
target.
Projection Method income genderCoarse Fine Coarse Fine
Full-Dimensional 84.50 69.76 87.33 50.00
Random Projection 58.33 50.50 59.17 50.00
PCA 73.33 70.33 81.67 50.00
DCA 80.00 73.50 56.00 50.00
MDR 76.67 68.33 58.00 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 1) 82.50 75.33 55.50 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 10
2) 80.00 75.16 54.67 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 10
4) 78.33 74.33 54.67 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 1) 79.17 74.66 55.00 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
2) 77.50 74.00 54.50 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
4) 76.67 73.83 54.17 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 1) 76.00 73.67 53.17 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
2) 75.00 73.50 52.67 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
4) 72.00 66.83 51.17 50.00
Table III: The Mean Accuracy Percentage Results of Census Income Dataset
with K = 1, gender being the utility target, and income being the privacy
target.
Projection Method gender incomeCoarse Fine Coarse Fine
Full-Dimensional 87.33 73.50 84.50 50.00
Random Projection 59.17 59.17 58.33 50.00
PCA 81.67 70.33 73.33 50.00
DCA 87.50 80.50 53.17 50.00
MDR 86.67 77.83 56.00 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 1) 88.00 82.5 57.17 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 10
2) 87.67 82.17 55.67 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 1, ρ′1 = 10
4) 87.50 82.17 55.50 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 1) 87.67 81.33 55.67 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
2) 86.67 81.17 54.67 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
4) 86.00 80.17 54.67 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 1) 87.00 80.33 54.33 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
2) 86.67 79.67 53.50 50.00
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
4) 85.67 78.67 52.67 50.00
Table IV: The Mean Accuracy Percentage Results of Bank Marketing Dataset
with K = 1, marketing being the utility target, and marital being the privacy
target.
Projection Method marketing maritalCoarse Fine Coarse Fine
Full-Dimensional 86.38 69.11 45.73 34.15
Random Projection 60.57 54.88 39.23 33.33
PCA 71.14 70.73 41.06 33.33
DCA 84.76 78.66 38.01 33.33
MDR 71.75 67.48 36.79 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 1.0, ρ′1 = 1.0) 86.38 81.30 39.63 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 1.0, ρ′1 = 10
2) 86.18 79.67 38.82 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 1.0, ρ′1 = 10
4) 85.37 78.66 38.41 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 1.0) 86.18 76.22 38.01 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
2) 85.98 75.61 37.60 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 102, ρ′1 = 10
4) 85.98 75.41 36.18 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 1.0) 85.37 75.20 36.99 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
2) 84.35 75.00 36.59 33.33
JUPA (ρ1 = 104, ρ′1 = 10
4) 83.13 74.59 35.77 33.33
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a two-step perturbation-based
utility-aware privacy-preserving data releasing framework. In
the first step, we proposed JUPA, a supervised DR method,
which outperforms several existing DR methods in terms of
providing utility and “somewhat privacy”, and provides the
flexibility for finding a favorable trade-off or tuning between
8utility and privacy by tuning the privacy parameters. In the
second step, we proposed a fine-grained perturbation approach,
which guarantees to provide the protection against inference
attacks on certain predefined privacy targets. In the experi-
mental evaluation, we deployed our frame in four scenarios
using three public dataset. The experiment results are inline
with our expectations and demonstrating the effectiveness and
practicality of our framework. Future work will include and
extension of JUPA to support non-linear sub-space projections,
and an optimized kernel selection method for our fine-grained
perturbation approach.
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